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I. Introduction
On 28 June 1999 the Council adopted a new
“Comitology” Decision which contains several
significant changes with respect to the previous Decision
of 1987. The term “comitology”1 which is well known
today was apparently coined in the European Parliament
in 1987.2 It refers to law-making procedures in the EC
which have, however, existed since the 1960s and
which involve committees composed of the represen-
tatives of the governments of the Member States at the
level of civil servants. Comitology in the last 40 years
has been probably the most fervently contested
interinstitutional battleground between the Commission,
Council and the European Parliament. It is the purpose
of this article to assess whether the new Decision can put
an end to that long-lasting struggle. For a better
understanding of the underlying reasons of this power
struggle and the positions of the different institutions,
first a brief overview of the most important steps from
the establishment of the first committees in the 1960s up
to the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 will be given. This is
followed by a detailed presentation of the major changes
introduced by the new Decision, based on a description
of the positions adopted by the Commission and the
European Parliament.
II. From the first committees to the Single
European Act and the Treaty of Amsterdam
In 1961 and 1962, the first elements of the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP) were established.3 These
initial steps already required extensive and detailed
technical regulation which the Council could not carry
out alone. The Council also lacked the resources to
respond to the needs of day-to-day management in this
area, which included the ability to take action quickly.
The Council did not wish to delegate the
implementation of the acts it adopted to the Commission
without having some form of control over the steps the
latter would take in carrying out this delegated task.
Therefore, several proposals were put forward as to how
this could be accomplished. The compromise that was
finally reached provided for the creation of committees
known as “Management Committees”. These comprised
representatives of the governments of the Member
States whose task it was to issue an opinion on the
implementing measures proposed by the Commission.
However, the Commission was entitled to adopt its
proposed measures immediately, even if the committee
gave a negative opinion by a qualified majority. In the
latter case, the proposed measures had to be referred
back to the Council, which could then take a different
decision (by qualified majority) within a specified time
– usually one month. This procedure allowed the
Commission to take particularly urgent steps without
delay, but at the same time provided the Council with
the possibility of intervening and modifying the
Commission decision.
Comitology was actually “born” on 4 April 1962
when the first management committee was established
by Art. 25f of regulation 19/62.4 Most sectors of the
CAP were subsequently established on this basis and the
implementation of decisions was carried out using a
variation of this (albeit only provisional) committee
procedure in each sector. Before the end of the transitional
periods for which the management committees had
been established (on 31 December 1969) the Council
decided to maintain the committees on a permanent
basis.5 Management committees eventually came to be
used for the entire agricultural field.
In 1966, there was a heated debate in the Council
about which committee procedure was to be chosen to
implement measures in the field of customs, veterinary
legislation and legislation on feedingstuffs and
foodstuffs. As a compromise, the first “Regulatory
Committee” was created on 27 June 1968 by regulations
802 and 803/68.6 The Commission could only implement
its proposals if the committee approved them by a
qualified majority. If this was not the case, it had to
submit its proposals to the Council. This procedure
introduced the provision that the Commission could,
nevertheless, implement its proposals if the Council had
failed to reach a decision within a certain period of time
specified in the act. This possibility was called a filet
(safety net) procedure. While the Council could agree to
this type of committee for the area of customs, there was
opposition from some Member States when it came to
veterinary matters and the fields of plant health and
feedingstuffs. Here, the filet procedure was comple-
mented by the contrefilet (double safety net) procedure.
From the very beginning, the European Parliament
followed the development of comitology with mistrust,7
since “measures of considerable scientific and political
importance” were being adopted “without the Parliament
being given any opportunity to exercise its obligation of
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control laid down in the Treaty”.8
The EP started pushing for the rationalisation of the
apparently ever-increasing number of committees in
the late 1970s and when the Commission calculated its
budget estimates for 1983, on the basis of a 31%
increase in the number of consultative bodies as
compared with 1981, the EP decided to freeze a
substantial part of the funds for committees.9 Based on
an interim report10 of the Committee on Budgetary
Control submitted in June 1983, the EP adopted a
resolution on the expenditure included in the Community
budget and on the efficiency of committees,11 in which
it expressed its concern about the fact that “the
Commission has no effective centralised system for
monitoring the activities of those committees” and that
“this situation has led to shortcomings, where
consultation activities are to some extent autonomous
and no longer fully under the Commission’s
supervision.” It demanded that strict rules should be
applied concerning, inter alia, the frequency and duration
of the meetings and the maximum number of participants
from the Member States whose travelling expenses
could be reimbursed. The Commission was asked to
report to the Parliament on the rationalisation procedure
and on the way in which appropriations had been
managed during the period of 1983 in which funds had
been frozen. In February 1984 the Commission submitted
a report which responded in detail to the Parliament’s
criticism and proposed to dissolve 132 committees
(21.9% of the total number).12 The EP subsequently
released the frozen funds in two stages.
The Single European Act and the 1987 Comitology
Decision
In the first major revision of the Treaty, the Single
European Act, which entered into force in 1987, the
provisions on implementation were amended. Article
155 [new 211] EC Treaty, which had been the legal basis
in the Treaty for comitology until then, only stated that
“the Commission shall exercise the powers conferred
on it by the Council for the implementation of the rules
laid down by the latter”.
• Article 145 [new 202] EC Treaty was amended to
the extent that it now provided not just for the
possibility of transfering powers but for an obligation
to do so: “... the Council shall ... confer on the
Commission, in the acts which the Council adopts,
powers for the implementation of the rules which the
Council lays down”. Conferring implementing
powers on the Commission was to be the rule; the
Council could only resort to reserving such powers
for itself in “specific cases”.
• Furthermore, the comitology system was given a
sound legal basis since Art. 145 [new 202] now
recognised that “the Council may impose certain
requirements in respect of the exercise of these
powers”.13
• Finally, following the proposal of the Commission
and after obtaining the opinion of the EP, the Council
was to lay down in advance the principles and rules
concerning these procedures. The Council’s
Comitology Decision of 13 July 198714 followed
that request. It restricted the number of possible
committee procedures to three (or rather five, since
two of them had two sub-variants a and b each):
– In Procedure I (Advisory Committee) the
Commission had to take the “utmost account” of
the opinion delivered by the committee.
– In Procedure II (Management Committee) the
Commission was to adopt measures which
applied immediately. If these measures were,
however, not in accordance with the opinion of
the committee, the Commission had to
communicate them to the Council. Variant a
stated the Commission “may” defer the
application of the measures, while Variant b
stated that it “shall” do so. The Council, acting
by a qualified majority, could take a different
decision.
– In Procedure III (Regulatory Committee) the
Commission was to adopt the measures only if
they were in accordance with the opinion of the
committee. If the measures were not in
accordance with the opinion of the committee,
or if no opinion was delivered, the Commission
was to submit a proposal to the Council
concerning the measures to be taken. In Variant
a) (filet procedure) the Commission would adopt
the proposed measures, if the Council had not
acted  by  qualified majority. In  Variant b)
(contrefilet procedure) the Commission would
adopt the proposed measures unless the Council
had decided against them by a simple majority.
The Commission was concerned about the
continuation of the III b) Procedure. In July 1987, it
adopted a Decision in which it stated that it would never
recommend a III b) Procedure in relation to a proposal
for a legal act.15 The fear the Commission had was that
the Council would resort to ever-heavier procedures –
and the Council did. Between 1987 and 1990 it set up
more than 30 III b) committees in the area of internal
market legislation, where the Commission had proposed
other procedures.16
The European Parliament challenged the Comitology
Decision before the Court of Justice on the grounds that
it was incompatible with the spirit of the Treaty and the
Single European Act. However, the case was declared
inadmissible by the Court.17
The Interinstitutional Agreements (Plumb-Delors,
Modus Vivendi, Samland-Williamsen)
The EP also considered it necessary to have greater and
more effective practical control over the way in which
the Commission carried out its executive powers. It
therefore requested the Commission to implement in
full the interinstitutional agreement as of 14 March
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providing effective information to, and the effective
consultation of, the Parliament. In the Plumb-Delors
Agreement,18 which was established by an exchange of
letters between the then President of the Commission,
Jacques Delors, and the then President of the EP, Henry
Plumb, the Commission committed itself to forwarding
all draft implementing acts of a “legislative nature” to
the Parliament at the same time as they were forwarded
to the implementation committee. “Routine” manage-
ment documents and documents whose adoption were
“urgent”, as well as “confidential” measures, were
excluded.
The co-decision procedure introduced in the Maastricht
Treaty (Art. 189b [new 251] EC Treaty) placed the EP
as co-legislator on an equal footing with the Council for
those legal acts that were to be adopted according to this
procedure. The Parliament, as co-legislator, now
expected to have the same rights as the Council in
controlling the Commission in the exercise of the
delegated implementing powers. In the view of the
Council the new powers did not go beyond a decision on
which powers were supposed to be delegated, and
which committee procedure was to be used.
On 20 December 1994, the Council, the EP and the
Commission reached an agreement on a Modus vivendi
to be applied until the 1996 Intergovernmental
Conference.19 This compromise provided that:
• the appropriate committee of the EP was to be sent,
at the same time and under the same conditions as
the committee comprised of representatives of
Member States, any draft general implementing act
submitted by the Commission, together with the
timetable for it.
• If this draft act was referred back to it, the Council
could only “adopt this act after informing the EP,
setting a reasonable time limit for obtaining its
opinion and, in the case of an unfavourable opinion,
taking due account of the EP’s point of view without
delay, in order to seek a solution in the appropriate
framework”.
• Additionally, the Commission was to take “into
account, as far as possible, any comments by the EP
and [keep] the Parliament informed at every stage of
the procedure” in order to enable it to assume its own
responsibilities in full knowledge of the facts.
Although the EP did not succeed in its efforts to be
placed on a completely equal footing with the Council
with respect to the implementation of EC law, it was
able to increase its participation in comitology to a
remarkable extent,20 by managing to obtain significantly
more information and being granted the right to be
consulted by the Commission as part of an informal
procedure.
Parliament kept up the pressure in December 1995,21
entering half of the expenditure for each type of
committee in the reserve of the general budget for
1996,22 since the Commission had refused to give any
information on the question of committees meeting in
public or to render public committee agendas and
membership lists to the EP. The Chairman of the budget
committee of the European Parliament and the Secretary
General of the Commission finally in September 1996
reached an agreement which provides for measures
regarding transparency in management and regulatory
committee proceedings, the so-called “Samland-
Williamsen Agreement”.23 It stipulated that the
Commission should make available to Parliament:
• “the annotated agendas for each meeting of
management and regulatory committees”; and
• the “results of votes in Management and Regulatory
Committees”.
Furthermore, it stated that if “Parliament or a
parliamentary committee wishes to attend the discussion
on certain items on the agenda of a committee, the
chairman will put the request to the committee, which
may take a decision; if the committee does not accept the
request, the chairman must give reasons for the decision;
Parliament may wish to publicise such reasons”.
The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference and the
Treaty of Amsterdam
Since the modus vivendi provided that the question of
comitology would be “examined in the course of the
revision of the Treaties planned for 1996, at the request
of the European Parliament, the Commission and several
Member States” and the Reflection Group was also
“invited to examine the question”, the issue came onto
the agenda of the Intergovernmental Conference.
The position of the Reflection Group24 was divided,
reflecting the contrasting views of the Member States
on the matter. Some members of the group took the
position that the best solution to the problem would be
to assign full powers to the Commission, subject to
supervision by the Council and the EP, whilst others
were only willing to consider simplified procedures
which would not undermine the Council’s executive
powers. A compromise position emerged, whereby a
single procedure was proposed under which it would be
up to the Commission, in consultation with national
experts, to decide on the implementing measures under
the supervision of the Council and the EP, which would
have the right to cancel the measures and request the
application of normal legislative procedures.
In its position of 13 May 1996,25 the EP requested
that the procedures be simplified by transferring overall
responsibility for implementing measures to the
Commission, which was to be supported only by an
advisory committee. Type II and III committees were to
be abolished altogether. The Council and the EP were to
be notified of the measures proposed and each was to
have the option of rejecting the Commission proposal
and calling for new implementing measures or the
initiation of a full legislative procedure.
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exercise its function as the executive body, subject to
review by the legislative authorities. It also pointed out
that the role of the EP should be taken into account in
instances where the basic act had been enacted by
co-decision. It proposed a procedure whereby the EP or
the Council could object to a draft measure which it had
proposed, in which case the measure would be adopted
by the co-decision procedure itself. In addition, the
Commission took the view that the number of
implementing procedures needed to be reduced, in
order to avoid debates between the institutions as to the
procedures to be followed. It also proposed that there
should be, at the very most, three types of committees,
namely one each for the Advisory, Management and
Regulatory Procedures and that the different variants in
the Comitology Decision should be dropped.
However, during the Amsterdam European Council in
June 1997 the Member States decided not to make any
amendments to the Treaty provisions relating to
implementing measures (Art. 202 [ex-145] and 211 [ex-
155]). Instead, a declaration was annexed to the
Amsterdam Treaty27 which provided as follows: “The
Conference calls on the Commission to submit to the
Council by the end of 1998 at the latest a proposal to
amend the Council Decision of 13 July 1987 laying
down the procedures for the exercise of implementing
powers conferred on the Commission”. According to
Art. 202, the Decision was to be adopted “by the
Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the
Commission and after obtaining the opinion of the
European Parliament”.
The fact that the Intergovernmental Conference did
not solve the issue was not surprising since the necessary
changes and adjustments (including a stronger
involvement of the EP) did not require any Treaty
amendments, but could be accomplished by a mere
amendment of the Comitology Decision. The declaration
showed, however, that the Member States recognised
the necessity of making changes.
III. The Commission proposal for a new
Comitology Decision
The Commission complied with the request of the IGC
well in time, on 16 July 1998, by submitting a proposal28
for a new Comitology Decision. It was to a great extent
in line with the position that the Commission had
already taken in its proposals for the “old” Comitology
Decision, and the modus vivendi, as well as with its
position during the IGC. But it also contained some new
elements.
The proposal had two main purposes:
• Firstly, the proposal provided for the establishment
of criteria for the use of the different procedures. For
example, “measures of general scope designed to
apply, update or adapt essential provisions of basic
instruments” were to be adopted by the Regulatory
Procedure. This was a new element in the
Commission proposals.
• And secondly, the existing procedures were supposed
to be simplified. It was proposed that the two sub-
variants in procedure II and III29 should be abolished:
the Management Procedure (II) was supposed to
become a mixture of procedures II a) and II b), and
the Regulatory Procedure (III) was supposed to be
changed significantly. If there was no qualified
majority in favour of the proposal in the committee,
the Commission was not to adopt the measures, but
it could “present a proposal relating to the measures
to be taken, in accordance with the Treaty.30”
Procedure III was therefore intended to be a “semi-
legislative procedure” in two respects: firstly, because
was to be reserved for “measures of general scope”,
that is measures of a legislative nature; secondly,
because it provided for the full legislative procedures
if there was no qualified majority in favour of the
proposal in the committee.
The proposal thus provided on the one hand for an
involvement of the European Parliament according to
the legislative procedure in all cases in which there was
a reasonable argument for parliamentary participation,
i.e. whenever the situation concerned the adoption of
measures of general scope (Procedure III). In other
matters (Procedures I and II) the separation of executive
and legislative powers remained respected.31 On the
other hand the proposal did not provide the EP with the
right to reject Commission proposals regardless of the
opinion of the comitology committee as demanded by
the EP in the context of the IGC. This was only to be the
case when there was no positive opinion of the committee,
so that the Parliament’s right of supervision was subject
to the views of the national civil servants.
The proposal finally provided for the European
Parliament to receive more information on comitology
matters. It was to receive agendas for committee
meetings, draft measures submitted to the committees
for the implementation of instruments adopted by the
co-decision procedure and the results of voting. It was
to also be informed whenever the Commission
transmitted measures or proposals for measures to be
taken to the Council.
IV. The opinion of the European Parliament
The opinion of the European Parliament of 6 May
199932 was amazingly ambiguous (not to say
contradictory) on the key issue, namely the involvement
of the European Parliament in comitology.
On the one hand, in the explanatory statement relating
to its proposal the EP demanded quite openly to be
placed on an equal footing with the Council in
comitology. It expressed its wish to “establish a system
whereby it can exercise proper scrutiny and, if necessary,
call back an implementing measure that it disagrees
with, when it stems from the co-decision procedure”.
Furthermore, the proposal fell “short of meeting the
European Parliament’s position” because “it is still only14 Eipascope 99/3
the committees which have the right to request the
Commission to refer back an implementing measure –
no equivalent right is given to the European
Parliament…. A matter referred back in such a way
from the executive to the legislative authority is sent to
the Council alone, rather than to both branches of the
legislative authority (European Parliament and
Council)…. The extension of the field of application of
the co-decision procedure provided for by the
Amsterdam Treaty implies that the control of the
European Commission’s executive activity has to be
assumed equally by the legislative authority (European
Parliament and Council)”.
Yet, the legislative proposal itself was – in contrast
to the explanatory statement – rather modest. The EP
proposed to limit its involvement to an ultra-virus
control, relating only to the legality of a measure but not
to its content. This becomes clear from the proposed
Recital 4a according to which “implementing measures
must not modify the basic legislation (including
annexes)” and “such legislation may not even be modified
where the Council claims implementing powers for
itself as the sole legislative authority”. The proposed
Art. 7a and 7b (“Protection of the legislative sphere”)
limit the involvement of the EP to being able to “challenge
the legality of the decision” (Art. 7a) and “ask the
Commission to submit a legislative proposal when the
EP considers that an implementing measure … exceeds
the implementing powers” (Art. 7b). This limitation of
the involvement of the EP is confirmed in another part
of the explanatory statement: one of the “most important
priorities to be taken into account in the modification of
the comitology system” was the “distinction between
‘substantial legislation’ and ‘implementation pro-
visions’, through a better definition in the basic act by
the delegation on the exercise of implementation powers
(given that, for the European Parliament, an
implementing measure does not amend, update or
complete the ‘essential aspect’ of normative provisions)”,
while “guaranteeing that the legislative authority, i.e.
the European Parliament and Council, does not intervene
in the implementing measures”.
Furthermore, the EP legislative proposal provided
for a simplification of the procedures and an elimination
of the Regulatory Committee Procedure. It also aimed
at improving the transparency of the procedures by
making all documents public except for reasons of
confidentiality, by the adoption of uniform rules of
procedure and by strenghtening the European
Parliament’s right to information with respect to draft
measures submitted to the committees, agendas,
summary records of committee meetings, attendance
lists and the results of voting.
V. Council Decision 1999/468 of 28 June 1999
The Council adopted the new Comitology Decision
1999/468/EC33 on 28 June 1999. It is strikingly different
from the 1987 Decision in the sense that the new
Decision is largely based on input from the Commission
and Parliament.
With regard to the establishment of criteria for the
choice of committee procedure and the simplification of
the procedures the Decision to a large extent adopted the
Commission proposal, whereas the new Regulatory
Committee Procedure is a modification of the proposal.
The Decision, furthermore, takes into account the
concerns of the European Parliament regarding the
protection of the legislative sphere. Finally, it aims at
introducing more transparency in comitology.
Establishment of criteria
Art. 2 of the Decision provides for criteria which
determine the choice of committee procedure for the
legislator. The criteria are thus – as the fourth
consideration of the Decision says expressly – “of a
non-binding nature”. They are very similar to those
proposed by the Commission:
• The Management Procedure is to be followed as
regards  “management measures such as those
relating to the application of the common agricultural
and common fisheries policies, or to the imple-
mentation of programmes with substantial budgetary
implications”.
• The Regulatory Procedure is to be followed as
regards “measures of general scope designed to
apply essential provisions of basic instruments,
including measures concerning the protection of the
health or safety of humans, animals or plants, as
well as measures designed to adapt or update certain
non-essential provisions of a basic instrument”.
• The Advisory Procedure is to be followed “in any
case in which it is considered to be the most
appropriate”.
The establishment of criteria has two advantages.
Firstly, the distinction between certain types of
implementing measures explains the necessity of having
three different types of committees, which is certainly
not self-evident. And secondly, it will make
disagreements between the institutions, in particular the
Council and Parliament, less likely. Such conflicts have
in the past even caused the failure of the adoption of
important pieces of legislation.34
Simplification of procedures
The simplification of the committee procedures concerns
the Management and Regulatory Procedures, which
will no longer have two variants each. Also the question
whether Art. 250 [ex-189a] was applicable in the III a)
Procedure, which led to much confusion,35 will become
obsolete. The same is true for the complex inter-
institutional agreements36. Thus the simplification
achieved by the new Decision should be seen as a
significant step.
With regard to the Management Procedure (Art. 4), the
Council basically accepted the proposal of the
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Procedure only with regard to the time period. The
Commission will adopt its proposed measures even in
the case of a negative opinion of the committee. In that
case:
• the Commission must, however, communicate them
to the Council;
• it may defer the application for up to three months;
and
• within that period, the Council may take a different
decision.
Moreover, the Commission recalled in a declaration37
to Art. 4 “that its constant practice is to try to secure a
satisfactory decision which will also muster the widest
possible support within the Committee” and gave is
assurance that it would “take account of the position of
the members of the Committee and act in such a way as
to avoid going against any predominant position which
might emerge against the appropriateness of an
implementing measure”.
The most substantial change relates to the Regulatory
Procedure (Art. 5): if the implementing measures
proposed by the Commission are not approved38 by a
qualified majority in the committee, the Commission
“shall, without delay, submit to the Council a proposal
relating to the measures to be taken” and shall “inform
the European Parliament”.
The Council can then either
• adopt the proposal by qualified majority; or
• “indicate by qualified majority that it opposes the
proposal”. In that case, the Commission “shall re-
examine it”. In doing so, it may:
– submit an amended proposal to the Council;
– re-submit its proposal; or
– present a legislative proposal on the basis of the
Treaty.39
• If on the expiry of a period of 3 months maximum
the Council has not adopted the proposed
implementing act or has not indicated its opposition
to the proposal for implementing measures, the
proposed implementing act will be adopted by the
Commission.
The Council therefore – in contrast to the former III
b) Procedure – is no longer able to reject a proposal by
simple majority. This is a logical amendment in view of
the enlargement of the EU, since a significant number of
small Member States will join in the next years. It was
nevertheless difficult to accept for the present smaller
Member States. Denmark in particular only finally
agreed to this amendment after the German presidency
submitted a compromise proposal. Under that
compromise, the Commission in a statement on the new
Comitology Decision40 made a commitment that “in the
review of proposals for implementing measures
concerning particularly sensitive sectors … in order to
find a balanced solution” it would “act in such a way as
to avoid going against any predominant position which
might emerge within the Council against the
appropriateness of an implementing measure”.
Any new committee set up has to comply with the new
procedures. But “old”, already existing, committees
also have to be adjusted in order to align them with the
new procedures. A Council and Commission Statement
on the new Decision41 provides for a two step procedure:
• In a first step, the provisions are adjusted “without
delay” in a rather mechanical way: current I
Procedures are turned into the new Advisory
Procedure, current II a) and II b) Procedures into the
new Management Procedure and current III a) and
III b) Procedures into the new Regulatory Procedure.
• But after this first step not all the committees will be
in conformity with the newly established criteria.
Therefore as a second step, a modification of the
type of committee, will “be made, on a case by case
basis, in the course of normal revision of legislation”.
As a consequence, e.g. the III a) Committee
established by Art. 15 of Council Regulation 443/9242
on financial and technical assistance to, and economic
cooperation with, the developing countries in Asia and
Latin America, will first be turned into a new Regulatory
Committee, and only later, “in the course of normal
revision of legislation”, into a Management Committee
(because its task is the “implementation of programmes
with substantial budgetary implications”).
Involvement of the European Parliament
The Decision furthermore provides for a (limited)
involvement of the European Parliament in the
implementation of acts adopted by co-decision. It accepts
the request of the European Parliament for a “protection
of the legislative sphere”, but rejects (possible) further-
reaching demands that it should be placed on an equal
footing with the Council:
• Under Art. 8, if the European Parliament “indicates
that draft implementing measures the adoption of
which is contemplated and which have been
submitted to a committee would exceed the
implementing powers provided for in the basic
instrument”, the Commission shall “review the draft
measures”.
The Commission may then:
– submit new draft measures to the committee;
– continue with the procedure; or
– submit a proposal to the European Parliament
and the Council on the basis of the Treaty.
The Commission shall also “inform the European
Parliament and the committee of the action which it
intends to take on the Resolution of the European
Parliament and the Council and of its reasons for
doing so”.
The same applies according to Art. 5 para. 5 if in the
framework of the Regulatory Procedure a proposal
is referred to the Council. In that case the European
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under the same conditions.
This new procedure is some kind of an “early-
warning” procedure in the sense that it gives the EP
the possibility of indicating its reservations to the
Commission or Council. But since the Commission
cannot be forced to withdraw its draft measure the
ultimate decision on whether a certain legal act is
ultra vires or not remains with the European Court
of Justice43 in the context of the already existing
procedure according to Art. 230 para. 3 [ex-173] EC
Treaty (in which Parliament is a privileged
applicant44).
• Finally, Art. 7 para. 3 provides that “the European
Parliament shall be informed by the Commission of
committee proceedings on a regular basis”. To that
end, it shall receive:
– agendas for committee meetings;
– draft measures submitted to the committees for
the implementation of instruments adopted by
the co-decision procedure;
– the results of voting;
– summary records of the meetings; and
– lists of the organisations to which the persons
designated by the Member States to represent
them belong.
It shall also be kept informed whenever the
Commission transmits measures or proposals for
measures to be taken to the Council.
These parts of the Decision replace the modus vivendi
and the Samland-Williamsen agreement. They limit the
involvement of the European Parliament in comitology
to an ultra vires control which is to make sure that
implementing measures do not exceed the implementing
powers provided for in the basic instrument. The EP is
thus not placed on an equal footing with the Council. In
some aspects the Decision does not go as far as what had
already been granted to the EP in the modus vivendi and
the Samland-Williamsen agreement (for example with
respect to the types of draft measures sent to the European
Parliament, the right to give an opinion in cases where
the Commission makes a proposal to the Council in a
Regulatory Committee Procedure, or the (theoretical)
right of Members of the EP to attend committee
meetings). The Decision, nevertheless, seems to be
acceptable to the EP. According to the press release of
the General Affairs Council meeting of 31 May 1999,45
the European Parliament had signalled that it “could
accept the compromise solution as in particular the so-
called ‘double safety net’ will disappear and as the
Council will have to act in future by qualified majority
to oppose a Commission proposal. The Parliament is
also satisfied that, under the new system, it will get
comprehensive information on the work of the
Committees and a right of scrutiny on every phase of the
procedure”. In fact, the introduction of the ultra vires
procedure (Art. 5 para. 5, Art. 8) is a remarkable success
for Parliament, considering the fact that the latter was
not even mentioned in the 1987 Decision.
Transparency
In the past, the lack of transparency in comitology has
been criticised repeatly.46 Now, information to the public
on committee procedures is supposed to be improved
substantially:
• The principles and the conditions in relation to
public access to documents which are applicable to
the Commission will also apply to the committees
(Art. 7 para. 2).
• The Commission will publish a list of all comitology
committees in the Official Journal within six months
of the entry into force of the Decision on 18 July
1999. This list will specify in relation to each
committee the basic instrument(s) under which the
committee is established (Art. 7 para. 4).
• From 2000 onwards the Commission will publish an
annual report on the working of the committees (Art.
7 para. 4).
• References for all documents sent to the European
Parliament will be made public in a register to be set
up in 2001 (Art. 7 para. 5).
Standard Rules of Procedure for Committees
According to Art. 7 para. 1 and a Council and Commission
statement concerning that provision, the Commission
will adopt standard rules of procedure for committees
by the end of 1999 which are to be the “basis” for the
rules of procedure to be adopted by each committee.
They will be published in the Official Journal and then
be proposed by the Commission to each committee.
They will then “adapt, in so far as necessary, their rules
of procedure to the standard rules”. Under the standard
rules of procedure, draft measures and agendas should
reach the Permanent Representations at least 14 days, in
urgent cases at least 5 days before a meeting.47
VI. Conclusion
The new Comitology Decision can be regarded as an
important step towards a modern system of comitology.
It establishes criteria for the use of the different
procedures, simplifies the so far unnecessarily
complicated procedures, provides for an adequate
involvement of the EP without violating the principle of
separation of executive and legislative powers, and
finally aims at reducing the secrecy in comitology – the
main reason for legitimate criticism of comitology.
The new Decision will not lead to any dramatic
shifts of power between the institutions involved in
comitology: the Commission will remain the most
important “player in the game”, and the role of the
European Parliament will remain rather limited. Only
the amendments with regard to the Regulatory
Committee Procedure will cause a shift of power between
the Commission and Council the effects of which are,
however, limited since both the Commission and the
Council “win” in one case and “loose” in the other. The
adoption of measures which used to fall under the
former III a) Procedure will become more difficult for
the Commission since now the Council can oppose a17 Eipascope 99/3
draft measure by qualified majority (before only by
unanimity). On the other hand, the adoption of measures
which used to fall under the old III b) Procedure will be
easier for the Commission: now the Council can oppose
a draft measure only by qualified majority (before by
simple majority).
Of course it remains to be seen how the new Decision
will work in practice – in particular with respect to the
implementation of the provisions on transparency. Yet
the chances that the new Decision will have a longer
“life” than the 1987 Decision did may not be bad.
It is certainly true that the “communitarian method”
is based on cooperation between the institutions, or, as
former Commission President Jacques Santer put it:
“L’efficacité de la méthode communautaire, on le voit
à propos de la comitologie, repose sur la bonne
coopération, sur une complémentarité organique, entre
les institutions”.48 But the experience of the last 40 years
seems to suggest that the adoption of the new Decision
is not very likely to end the power struggle of the
institutions over comitology – after all the new Decision
does not confer the control of the Commission’s
executive activity equally on the Parliament and Council.
Maybe the new Decision will be the beginning of a new
era of comitology, in which rather than disagreeing over
the fundamental issues, the institutions will struggle
over the scope of implementing powers and the content
of implementing legislation in specific cases.
RÉSUMÉ
Le Conseil a adopté, en juin 1999, la nouvelle décision
de “comitologie” 1999/468 qui contient un certain
nombre de modifications importantes par rapport à
l’ancienne décision de 1987. Au cours des quarante
dernières années, la comitologie a été probablement le
champ de bataille interinstitutionnel qui a connu les
luttes les plus acharnées entre la Commission, le Conseil
et le Parlement européen.
Après un bref aperçu des étapes les plus importantes
depuis la création des premiers comités dits de
comitologie jusqu’au Traité d’Amsterdam, cet article
présente la proposition de la Commission, l’avis du
Parlement européen ainsi que les principales
modifications introduites par la nouvelle décision du
Conseil. Cette décision fixe les critères pour le recours
aux différentes procédures prévues, simplifie ces
procédures, prévoit une implication limitée du Parlement
européen et, enfin, entend accroître la transparence.
La nouvelle décision ne devrait pas entraîner de
grands bouleversements dans la répartition des pouvoirs
entre les institutions impliquées dans la comitologie: la
Commission demeurera le principal “acteur de la partie”
et le rôle du Parlement européen restera relativement
limité. Seules les modifications concernant la procédure
du Comité de réglementation causeront un léger
glissement dans le rapport de force entre la Commission
et le Conseil.
Enfin, cet article se livre à une première évaluation
de la nouvelle décision. Bien que l’expérience de ces 40
dernières années semble suggérer que l’adoption d’une
nouvelle décision ne risque probablement pas de mettre
un terme à la lutte pour le pouvoir que se livrent les
institutions sur le terrain de la comitologie, cette décision
pourrait bien marquer le début d’une ère nouvelle pour
la comitologie. Ainsi, à l’avenir, le conflit entre les
diverses institutions concernées, plutôt que de porter
sur des questions fondamentales, pourrait se concentrer
sur la portée des pouvoirs d’exécution et sur le contenu
de la législation d’exécution dans certains cas
spécifiques.
___________________
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